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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE "OPEN DOOR."
I!V ROSCOE C. E. IJROWN.
IS THE "open door" in the Philippines a "political myth"?
Has the Government of the United States exceeded its powers
and promised what it cannot perform in announcing to the nations
through its Peace Commissioners at Paris its policy "to maintain
in the Philippines an open door to the world's commerce"? With
the near prospect of the restoration of normal conditions in the
islands these become practical questions. On the answer to them
will depend our power to make our Asiatic possessions an aid to
the liberal trade policy which we in common with Great Britain are
trying to uphold in China, instead of having our presence in the
Orient a stumbling-block in our own commercial path and an irri-
tation to the rest of the world.
Those who hold that no separate tariff for the Philippines is
possible base their opinion on the Constitutional provision :
'
' The congress shall have power :
"To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts, and
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States ; but all
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
The interpretation of this rule as applying to our new posses-
sions requires the assumption, first, that all territories of the United
States under all conditions are within the United States in the
meaning of the Constitution, and, secondly, that in the view of the
organic law the Philippines cannot possibly be differentiated from
continental territory. Two cases in the Supreme Court are relied
upon to uphold the first contention. One is the dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall^ in 1820. Arguing that Congress had power to
extend a general direct tax to the District of Columbia, the Chief
Justice remarked :
iLoughhorougli vs. Blake, 5 Wheaton 319.
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"The power, then, to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises may be ex-
ercised, and must be exercised, throughout the United States. Does this term des-
ignate the whole or any particular portion of the American empire ? Certainly this
question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great Republic
which is composed of States and Territories."
More directly touching the Philippine tariff question is the
decision of the Supreme Court ^ upholding the collection of duties
under the United States tariff, without action of Congress or the
establishment of a collection district, in California in 1849. Justice
Wayne in his opinion said :
" By the ratifications of the treaty California became a part of the United
States. And as there is nothing differently stipulated in the treaty with respect to
commerce, it became instantly bound and privileged by the laws which Congress
had passed to raise a revenue from duties on imports and tonnage. . . .
"The right claimed to land foreign goods within the United States at any
place out of a collection district, if allowed, would be a violation of that provision
in the Constitution which enjoins that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States."
Cliange "California" to "the Philippines," it is said, and the
open door is closed. True, it might be, if the Supreme Court, on
the case being presented to it, were to decide that with the trans-
position that decision was still good law. There are many reasons
to believe, however, that on review the Court might hold that even
our continental territories were outside the United States of the
Constitution, and that its tariff applied to them from convenience
and not from necessity. And, even if it did not, it is still a far cry
from American California to the Asiatic Philippines.
From the first organisation of the Government Congress has
been treating territory as in one way or another outside the Con-
stitution, governing it in violation of general provisions of the Con-
stitution which are more fundamental and less limited as to time
and place than the tariff rule, and the Supreme Court itself has re-
peatedly upheld such practices.
The original charter of the United States Bank, approved on
February 25, 1791, authorised the directors to establish offices of
discount and deposit "wheresoever they shall think fit within the
United States." On the annexation of Louisiana they desired to
establish a branch in New Orleans, but nobody considered that they
had the power to do so. By order of the House of Representa-
tives the Committee of Ways and Means of that body drafted a bill
extending the bank's privileges, and on March 23, 1804, the Presi-
dent signed the law authorising the directors to establish branches
1 Cross vs. Harrison, i6 Howard 164.
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on the terms of the original act "in any part of the territories or
dependencies of the United States." Possibly that was an unneces-
sary law, but it clearly reveals the views of the men who had a
hand in making the Constitution about its territorial application.
It shows, too, that the idea of "dependencies" could net have been
so foreign to "the Fathers" as their descendants sometimes sup-
pose, since they, who were always splitting constitutional hairs and
living in daily fear of opening the door to tyranny, were willing to
contemplate "dependencies" in their laws.
The internal revenue laws under the Constitution are as uni-
versal and uniform in their application as the tariff laws, but it was
not until 1868 that they were by act of Congress ^ extended to apply
to all places "within the exterior boundaries of the United States."
A curious phrase that, suggesting an interior boundary beyond
which the enforcement of the revenue law is a matter of discretion.
The territories thus embraced by that act were the Indian reserva-
tions and the lands of the Civilised Tribes which the revenue col-
lector had not before invaded. But long before that an internal
boundary had been marked out for him. The first internal tax
on spirits distilled in the United States was levied by the act of
March 3, 1791, which, for the purpose of collection, ordered "that
the United States shall be divided into fourteen districts, each con-
sisting of one State." The Territories of the United States were
entirely neglected, though they had growing towns, and it was not
until 1798 that " The Annals of Congress" showed the existence of
a supervisor of internal revenue in Ohio.
The constitutional rule for direct taxes, instead of requiring
uniformity, orders that they shall be "apportioned among the sev-
eral States which may be included within this Union according to
their respective numbers." This provision is apparently co-exten-
sive with that concerning duties. If the makers of the Constitution
were so deeply concerned that the burden of indirect taxes should
be laid fairly on all, they must have been equally anxious that the
direct tax burden should be borne by all, after the method of ap-
portionment, which was considered equitable in that case. The
two clauses must be taken together, and the fact that the one in pro-
viding uniformity mentions the United States as a whole, and the
other in prescribing rules of proportion among the parts refers to
the area of taxation distributively, cannot be taken to mean that
the tax limits in the two cases are different. In the first quarter
century of the Government's operation several direct taxes were
I Section 3, 448,
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laid, and solely in the States. Finally one was extended to terri-
tory, and in upholding it Chief Justice Marshall delivered his dic-
tum, already referred to, defining " the American Empire." He
himself felt embarrassed by his own rule, and confessed difficulty
in reconciling a tariff necessarily operative in the Territories with a
direct tax operative there or not, at the discretion of Congress. He
contented himself with deciding that at any rate, even if Congress
was not obliged to tax the Territories, it had the power to do so,
and that was the point at issue before the Court. It would seem a
good deal more natural to suppose that if Congress had discretion
in the one case it had in the other.
The original law for the collection of customs, passed July 31,
1789, divided the States into collection districts, but entirely
neglected the Territories. The only collector in the Western coun-
try was at Louisville, then in the State of Virginia, and his juris-
diction extended from the Falls of the Ohio to the mouth on the
Southern side. The territorial bank of that river was free for the
landing of goods without duty. \'ermont was left without a custom
house until its admission as a State, and so was Tennessee, but as
soon as either was admitted a port was established in it, evidently
out of scrupulous regard for the Constitution, which forbade pref-
erence to ports of one State over those of another. It was not until
1799 that the customs laws were put in force in any part of the
Northwest Territory.
When the Louisiana treaty came up for debate the preference
for French and Spanish vessels was attacked as unconstitutional.
Of course it was defensible as a reservation or "burden upon the
fee.' But having doubts of the power of the Government, even as
a condition of acquirement, to give a privilege which did not har-
monise with the Constitution, the supporters of the treaty preferred
to defend the grant as concerning things outside the Constitution.
Congressman Nicholson, one of the leaders of the House whose
word carried weight, thus stated the Administration's position : ^
"Whatever may be the future destiny of Louisiana, it is certain that it is not
now a State. It is a territory purchased by the United States in their confederate
capacity, and may be disposed of by them at pleasure. It is in the nature of a
colony whose commerce may be regulated without reference to the Constitution.
Had it been the Island of Cuba, which was ceded to us under a similar condition of
admitting French and Spanish vessels for a limited time into the Havannah, could
it possibly have been contended that this would be giving a preference to the ports
of one State over those of another, or that the uniformity of duties, imposts and
excises throughout the United States would have been destroyed ? . . .
1 Annals of Congress, i8o3-'o4, p. 471.
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" The restrictions in the Constitution are to be strictly construed, and I doubt
whether under a strict construction the very same indulgence might not be granted
to the port of Natchez, which does not lie within any State, but in the territory of
the United States."
The judicial power of the United States is explicitly defined
by the Constitution, yet the courts in the Territories are and for
nearly a century have been organised without regard to the Con-
stitution and clearly in violation of it— if they are under its control.
All the judicial power of the United States of the Constitution is
vested in courts whose judges hold office during good behavior,
and to them are committed certain functions which are exclusively
their own. They cannot be alienated by Congress. Wherever the
Constitution runs no other courts are capable of receiving those
judicial powers which are reserved to the Federal courts, and which
they are commanded to assume. As early as 1816 Justice Story
declared, with the concurrence of the whole Court ^ : "No part of
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can consistently with
the Constitution be delegated to State tribunals. The admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction is of the same exclusive cognisance; and
it can only be in those cases where previous to the Constitution
State tribunals possessed jurisdiction independent of National au-
thority that they can now constitutionally exercise a concurrent
jurisdiction." Nevertheless in the Territories courts which were
not Federal courts, which were incapable of receiving Federal
jurisdiction, exercised jurisdiction of that "exclusive cognisance."
In 1828 the exercise of maritime jurisdiction by a Territorial court
of Florida was questioned, and in his argument to the Supreme
Court in defence of Territorial authority Daniel Webster said :
" What is Florida ? It is no part of the United States. How can it be ? How-
ls it represented ? Do the laws of the United States reach Florida ? Not unless
by particular provisions. The Territory and all within it are to be governed by the
acquiring power, except where there are reservations by the treaty. . . . Florida
was to be governed by Congress as she thought proper. What has Congress done?
She might have done anything—she might have refused trial by jury and refused a
Legislature."
Mr. Webster won his case. Chief Justice Marshall, writing
the opinion, said "^
:
" It has been contended that, by the Constitution, the judicial power of the
United States extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that
the whole of this judicial power must be vested in ' one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish.
1 Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheaton 304.
2 American Insurance Company vs. Canter, i Peters 542.
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Hence it has been argued that Congress cannot vest admiralty jurisdiction in courts
created by the Territorial Legislature.
"We have only to pursue this subject one step further to perceive that this
provision of the Constitution does not apply to it. The next sentence declares that
the judges both of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during
good behavior.' The judges of the superior courts of Florida hold their offices for
four years. These courts then are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial
power conferred by the Constitution on the general government can be deposited.
They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue
of the general right of sovereignty, which exists in the Government, or in virtue of
that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations re-
specting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which
they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the third
article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the Territories of the United States.
Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States in those courts only
which are established in pursuance of the third article of the Constitution, the
same limitation does not extend to the Territories. In legislating for them Con-
gress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a State government. "
In 1849 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this doctrine even more
explicitly, and Justice Nelson made this broad statement about
Territories ^
:
" They are not organised under the Constitution, nor subject to its complex
distribution of the powers of government, as the organic law ; but are the creations
exclusively of the legislative department and subject to its supervision and control.
Whether or not there are provisions in that instrument which extend to and act
upon these Territorial governments it is not now material to examine."
This last suggestion of an open question as to some shadowy
constitutional authorit}' over the Territories is particularly interest-
ing in view of Chief Justice Taney's persistent tendency to subject
the government of the Territories to the checks of the Constitution
for the protection of slavery. The California tariff opinion, which
was almost contemporary with Justice Nelson's, was written by
Justice Wayne, of Georgia. He was the man who persuaded the
court in the Dred Scott case of the expediency of declaring that
Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the Territories,
and he was the only member of it who fully concurred with Chief
Justice Taney's opinion. His pleading of the Constitution to justify
the California tariff, when it might equally well have been justified
as a general exercise of sovereignty, and probably would have been
by some other judge, is to be considered in the light of the pro-
slavery policy of restricting the powers of the general government.
This culminated in the Dred Scott decision, denying that the power
"to make all needful rules and regulations" for the Territories ap-
iBenner vs. Porter. 9 Howard 235.
IHE CONSTITUTION AND THE OPEN DOOR. lOI
plied to more than the old Northwest Territory, and holding that
other territory was impressed with a trust for Statehood and already
in anticipation subject to the constitutional checks on administrative
discretion. Such a contention makes the Government's whole course
in dealing with the Louisiana Purchase, and even the Louisiana
treaty itself, unconstitutional. A theory of the Constitution which
inevitably reaches the conclusion that ever since 1804 the country
has treated that document as " blank paper," to recall the strict
constructionist Justice Campbell's sneer at Jefferson, is certainly
open to question and. suspicion.
In many details of government the Constitution as a funda-
mental law for a United States larger than the States composing it
has been made blank paper by events. It is well settled that the
constitutional guarantee of jury trial does not extend to actions in
the State courts. It is equally well settled that it does extend to
all exercise of judicial power by the Federal Government of the
Constitution. The first bill for the government of the Territory of
Orleans, however, which was drawn by Madison in co-operation
with Jefferson and passed in 1804, restricted trial by jury to capital
cases in criminal prosecutions, entirely in violation of the Consti-
tution— if it applied. It also vested the appointment of the Legis-
lative Council in the President, without confirmation by the Senate,
though the Constitution requires the advice and consent of the
Senate to the appointment of specified functionaries "and all other
officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established bylaw." No
pretence was made in the debates that these legislators were "in-
ferior officers " such as Congress could authorise the President or
heads of departments to appoint.
The establishment of this despotism did not pass unchallenged.
The bill was denounced as conferring "royal" powers. It was said
it did "not evince a single trait of liberty." In the House of Re-
presentatives G. W. Campbell, of Tennessee, made an earnest con-
test for the jury trials and the courts of the Constitution, arguing
that "in legislating for the people of Louisiana" Congress was
"bound by the Constitution of the United States." A similar at-
tempt at amendment was made in the Senate, but was voted down.
Among the majority were suoh men as John Breckenridge, of Ken-
tucky, a champion of strict construction and the supposed author
of the famous Kentucky Resolutions ; Timothy Pickering, of Massa
chusetts
;
Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey; Uriah Tracy, of Con-
necticut, and that stanch Jeffersonian, Wilson Carey Nicholas, of
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Virginia—a strange medley of Federalists and State Rights men,
who seemed to agree on nothing about the Constitution except that
it did not apply to the Territories. Indeed, the prevailing opinion
through the whole course of Louisiana legislation was strongly in
that direction.
Many more scruples were entertained about the right of Con-
gress to bring new peoples within the operation of the Constitution,
and not rule them as colonists, than about any obligation arising
from the Constitution itself to govern territory, regardless of ex-
pedienc}^, according to its specific provisions. Much was said in
both houses of the treaty guarantees of constitutional privileges,
and the Louisiana bill was attacked as not keeping the promise to
France to incorporate the Territor}^ into the Union as soon as might
be consistent with the principles of the Constitution. The Jeffer-
sonian philosophers of liberty anxiously debated among themselves
the duty of the United States to live up to its own ideals of free-
dom. But the suggestion that it must live up to them by a rule of
thumb application of a compact made for a union of States found
little credit even among those who construed that instrument most
strictly in its relation to States. Caesar A. Rodney's declaration^
that the Constitution "does not limit or restrain the authority of
Congress with respect to Territories, but vests them with full and
complete power to exercise a sound discretion generally on the sub-
ject," was echoed by many other debaters.
This same question came up with reference to Florida in 1822.
The bill was modelled on that of Orleans in its administrative fea-
tures, and contained a section forbidding the Territorial govern-
ment to transgress the personal rights guaranteed to the people of
the States by the Constitution. Mr. Montgomery, of Kentucky,
tried to substitute a clause that all the principles of the Constitu-
tion and all the prohibitions to legislation, as well with respect to
Congress as the Legislatures of the States, be "declared to be
applicable to the said Territory, as paramount acts." This was
voted down, and the following is Benton's comment on the inci-
dent -
:
"This prompt rejection of Mr. Montgomery's proposition shows what the
Congress of 1822 thought of the right of Territories to the enjoyment of any part
of the Constitution of the United States. . . . The only question between Mr.
Montgomery's proposition and the clause already in the bill was as to the tenure by
which these rights should be held—whether under the Constitution of the United
1 Annals of Congress. i8o3-'o4, p. 513.
- Benton's Abridgement, \'ol. VII, p. 295, note.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE OPEN DOOR. IO3
States or under a law of Congress and the treaty of cession. And the decision was
that they should be held under the law and the treaty. Thus a direct issue was made
between constitutional rights on one hand and the discretion of Congress on the
other in the government of this Territory, and decided promptly and without de-
bate (for there was no speech after that of Mr. Rea on either side) against the Con-
stitution. It was tantamount to the express declaration: ' You shall have these
principles which are in the Constitution, but not as a constitutional right ; nor even
as a grant under the Constitution, but as a justice flowing from our discretion, and
as an obligation imposed by the treaty which transferred you to our sovereignty.'"
Justice Story, in his commentaries,^ has thus stated this doc-
trine :
" The power of Congress over the public territory is clearly exclusive and uni-
versal, and their legislation is subject to no control, but is absolute and unlimited,
unless so far as it is affected by stipulations in the cessions or by the ordinance of
1787, under which any part of it has been settled."
A host of Supreme Court decisions laying down this law with
some reservations might be cited. When those reservations are
quoted in support of constitutional restraint on Territorial lawmak-
ing it is to be remembered that the Constitution, as well as the
general laws of the United States, are in force by legislation in the
Territories. It is indeed curious that Congress should have made
the Constitution into a law for the Territories, if that Constitution
of itself governed them, but it has done so time and time again in
particular cases, and finally summed up these enactments generally
in Section 1,891 of the Revised Statutes, which declares :
" The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally in-
applicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organised Territories
and in every Territory hereafter organised as elsewhere within the United States. '
Thus the open question of Justice Nelson's time has been prac-
tically closed, and the Supreme Court has for years been declaring
as a fact that the fundamental personal rights guaranteed by the
Constitution belong to the inhabitants of the Territories. In some
cases undoubtedly the opinions tend to uphold the view that the
so-called Bill of Rights and the general limitations of the Consti-
tution by their own force extend to the Territories. But even while
conceding these rights the Supreme Court often shows a tendency
to do so merely on the theory that the old Anglo-Saxon "law of
the land " protects all within the range of government from tyranny
and injustice.
Thus Justice Bradley- says:
"Doubtless Congress in legislating for the Territories would be subject to
those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in
1 Section, 1328. 2 Mormon Church vs. United States, 136, U. S. i.
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the Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations would exist, rather by
inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives
all its powers, than by any other express and direct application of its provisions.'
It may be conceded that every officer of our Government, owing
to its very nature, must exercise his functions in harmony with the
spirit of our institutions, with what Justice Matthews^ called "the
principles of constitutional liberty which restrain all the agencies
of government. State and National." But that does not compel the
application to Territories of particular rules of administration made
by States for the government of States in their united capacit}^
And it should be remembered in construing these rules that, how-
ever much the country may have grown and the idea of a broader
nationality developed, the framers of the Constitution formed a gov-
ernment for States and committed the territory or other property
which might fall to the general government to its complete discre-
tion, with a general grant of power. So those who first added new
territory understood and acted, though they were strict construc-
tionists and theoretical democrats.
Perhaps the Louisiana legislation ought to have been declared
unconstitutional. But if so, what is to be said of the condemna-
tion to death or imprisonment without jury trial of American cit-
izens by Ministers and Consuls for crimes committed at places con-
structively made American territory for that purpose by treaty with
foreign governments? There is no constitutional warrant for it. If
trial by jury is a right of all men subjected to the authority of the
United States, is it not as much their right in a consulate at Yoko-
hama as in a courthouse at Santa Fe ? The Supreme Court has
frankly cut this Gordian knot since it could not untie it. It has
said- that though a private American vessel is constructively Amer-
ican territory, yet an offence on it can be punished by a consid
without jury trial, for "By the Constitution, a Government is or-
dained and established for the 'United States of America' and not
for countries outside their limits. . . . The Constitution can have
no operation in another country."
The rule of uniformity in taxation of what is essentially one
people is so manifestly advisable that nobody would wish to change
it or even open the door to change. But in view of all the excep-
tions made in practice to the necessary application of the Constitu-
tion to the home Territories, and the political purpose, which about
1850 demanded limitation of the power over them, it is a violent
I Murpliy vs. Ramsey, 11+ U. S. 15. 2 in re Ross, 140 U. S. 453.
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assumption to assert that a rule laid down in one particular case
then would be literally and slavishly applied to overturn a deliber-
ate policy of the Government formed to meet utterly different con-
ditions which the Court did not and could not foresee.
The Supreme Court itself in the California tariff decision in-
timated as much. It noted that California was part of the United
States by treaty, and it found nothing in the treaty to differentiate
it from the rest of the United States. The California treaty did
promise to incorporate the Territory into the Federal Union, and
naturally judges with the ''trust for Statehood " idea in mind would
give that promise immediate effect so far as they were concerned
with government under it. The fact that they consulted the treaty
to learn the Territory's status with reference to the Constitution
implies that even this State Rights Court would have regarded a
treaty for acquiring a dependency as giving the acquisition quite a
different character.
In that respect the Philippines hold an entirely distinct rela-
tion to the general government. They are not by treaty taken ac-
tually or prospectively into the Union. The United States has
simply assumed possession of the Philippines. It holds them, just
as all the Federalists, and, indeed, many of the Republicans, be-
lieved in 1803 it could alone hold Louisiana. The narrow con-
struction which denied the jxiwer of expansion for assimilation has
been outgrown. Certainly, it is too late to bind the country in a
similar bond of narrow construction carried to an opposite extreme.
Nor is there anything new or startling in the idea of dependencies
outside the United States. Neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has ever hesitated to recognise and provide for territorial and
administrative anomalies. The Louisiana and Florida govern-
ments w^ere, as has been seen, utterly inconsistent with the Con-
stitution. The Indians, with their separate laws in States and
Territories, have ever been anomalies, and offer a precedent for
dealing quite unhampered with Orientals as their needs may require.
Our extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised by Federal officers
since 1848 has no warrant in the Constitution for an\' Ignited States
of the Constitution.
Congress did not hesitate to use the word "dependencies"' in
legislating for the United States Bank.
Later, in 1S56, it made laws for the government of the Guano
Islands, which at the discretion of the President might "be con-
sidered as appertaining to the United States.' In other words,
they were territory of the United States w'hich was not within it.
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Finally, the Xlllth Amendment to the Constitution declares
that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude "shall exist within
the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction." The
men who drew this had been through the slavery contest, knew the
doctrine of limited power in the Territories, and had repudiated it,
and won their case in war. They passed the Amendment in the
light of their own contention to assure the exclusion of slavery from
any territory which Congress ruled or might rule outside the United
States of the Constitution.
The supposition that the term United States in that instrument
means more than the government over the States united requires
the assumption of its use in two utterly different meanings without
any indication of the difference. Thus it must be said that the
"people of the United States" who make and amend the Constitu-
tion are people of States, but the United States for which the pre-
amble says they make the Constitution is the whole "American
Empire ; " that the United States of the Judiciary Article means
only States, but of the Tariff Article all the territories or depen-
dencies over which the Government may extend its rule. And that
in face of the final use and implied definition in the Xlllth Amend-
ment of that term in the narrower significance.
Such a restricted meaning is fully in accord with common
sense. Who thinks of the Philippines as being in the United
States? They are manifestly no part of the system for which our
Constitution was made. The belief that the Constitution must of
necessity apply to the home Territories, in spite of evidence that
the founders and early rulers had no such thing in mind, is due in
its present form largely to the feeling of continental interest and
common American nationality. The interpretation of the Constitu-
tion as a fundamental law for Asiatic islands simply because this
country is called upon to rule them is no proper development of
that idea of the American Nation. "The Constitution can have no
operation in another country," and the Philippines, even though
we control them, are another country, physically, morally, socially
and commercially.
The reversal of the California tariff decision is not essential to
the "open door." The reasons for questioning the law it laid down
for this continent are cited only to show clearly how little ground
there is in the circumstances of its delivery, and in our history, for
stretching its meaning to forbid a Government policy in an emer-
gency which its authors never contemplated. Courts do not thus
tie the hands of Government with reference to particular situations
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which cannotlbe foreseen. In a constitution, as Story says, "there
ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies as they
may happen, and as these are . . . inimitable in their nature, so it
is impossible safely to limit that capacity."
It has not been limited in this country. The Constitution, in
spite of being written, is mobile. It never would have been adopted
if its meaning to the present generation had been known to those
who drew it, if, for instance, it had been understood as an indis-
soluble compact instead of a voidable association. Those who
thought it made blank paper by the changed interpretations cir-
cumstances forced were merely victims of the tendency to limit by
one day's conceptions the power of meeting another's needs. Some
American trader may follow the example of the plaintiff in the Cali-
fornia case, and strive to avoid duties at Manila, or some Spanish
interest may seek, regardless of this country's welfare, to close the
door to the world's commerce in the Philippines. But it is scarcely
conceivable that either could overturn in those distant islands,
which have nothing in common with this country and are not a part
of its industrial system, a considered policy of the United States
with reference to international relations, by invoking a disputed
constitutional doctrine, which, even if true, is true only for "the
United States of America."
